In the previous post — “Using modbus-cli to Read and Write Modbus Coils in LabShock” — I showed something simple:

We were able to read and write Modbus coils… with no authentication.

In this part, I continued the experiment inside LabShock (OilSpring Air lab), but instead of coils, I focused on actual process values—and also writing directly to registers.

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The Setup (Operator View)

From the OpenPLC monitoring dashboard, everything looks clean:

• pump1_speed_in → %QW10 → 50
• pump1_speed_out → %IW10 → 50
• pump1_temp → %IW11 → 16
• pump1_pressure → %IW12 → 3158

You just see:

• Speed
• Temperature
• Pressure

That’s the operator view.

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Reading via Modbus (What We Did)

After installing modbus-cli, I ran:

modbus read 192.168.2.10 %MW10 20

Quick breakdown:

• modbus read → read from device
• 192.168.2.10 → PLC IP
• %MW10 → start from memory word 10
• 20 → read 20 values

So we dump:

• %MW10 → %MW29

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What We Got

From the output:

• %MW10 = 50
• %MW20 = 50
• others mostly 0

One command → raw memory view.

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Making Sense of %QW, %IW, %MW

%QW10 → Output

What the PLC sends (e.g., pump speed)

%IW10 → Input

What the PLC reads (sensor values)

%MW10 → Memory

Internal storage used by the program

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Why We Saw Those Values

Even though the dashboard shows %QW and %IW, we read %MW.

That’s because PLC logic often copies values internally:

%QW10 → %MW10
%IW10 → %MW20

So:

We didn’t read outputs or inputs directly—we read their copies.

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Writing to a Register (New Part)

Now the important part.

We didn’t just read—we also wrote to memory.

modbus write 192.168.2.10 %MW10 60

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Breaking It Down

• modbus write → send value to PLC
• 192.168.2.10 → PLC IP
• %MW10 → target register (memory word 10)
• 60 → value to write

So:

Write value 60 into memory address %MW10

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What Happens After Writing

If you check:

• OpenPLC dashboard (or SCADA in LabShock)

You will see the value change.

To confirm from CLI:

modbus read 192.168.2.10 %MW10 1

This reads only one value.

You should now see:

• %MW10 = 60

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Why This Is Important

This is not just reading anymore.

This is:

Direct modification of PLC data

Depending on the logic, this could:

• Change setpoints
• Affect process behavior
• Influence outputs indirectly

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Operator vs What We Did

Operator	What We Did
Uses dashboard	Used Modbus CLI
Sees values	Reads raw memory
No direct memory access	Full access
Controlled UI	No restrictions

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What This Proves

This reinforces the same point as Part 1:

Modbus is not secure by design.

We were able to:

• Read process values
• Dump memory
• Write to registers
• Write to coils (Part 1)

All of this:

• No authentication
• No encryption
• No validation

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Why This Matters

1. Read = Recon

You can map the system just by reading.

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2. Write = Impact

You can influence the system by writing.

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3. No Barriers

If you can reach the PLC:

You can interact with it.

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What Defenders Should Take From This

• Restrict Modbus access (segmentation is critical)
• Monitor read activity, not just writes
• Understand what each register exposes
• Treat internal memory as sensitive

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Final Thought

Part 1 showed we can control coils.
Part 2 shows we can read and modify process values.

When a protocol lets you read and write critical data with no authentication,
that’s not a misconfiguration — that’s the design.

And once you see that layer,
you’re no longer looking at the system like an operator…
you’re seeing it like an attacker.